Using Housing Futures in Mortgage Research by Zhu, Shuang et al.
This is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript as accepted for publication.  The 
publisher-formatted version may be available through the publisher’s web site or your 
institution’s library.  
This item was retrieved from the K-State Research Exchange (K-REx), the institutional 
repository of Kansas State University.  K-REx is available at http://krex.ksu.edu 
 
Using Housing Futures in Mortgage Research 
 
Shuang Zhu · R. Kelley Pace · Walter A. Morales 
 
 
How to cite this manuscript 
 
If you make reference to this version of the manuscript, use the following information: 
 
Zhu, S., Pace, R. K., & Morales, W. A. (2014). Using Housing Futures in Mortgage 
Research. Retrieved from http://krex.ksu.edu 
 
 
Published Version Information 
 
 
Citation: Zhu, S., Pace, R. K., & Morales, W. A. (2014). Using Housing Futures in 
Mortgage Research. Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 48(1), 1-15. 
 
 
Copyright: © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2012 
 
 
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):10.1007/s11146-012-9381-0 
 
 
Publisher’s Link: http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11146-012-9381-0  
 
 
 
Using Housing Futures in Mortgage Research
Shuang Zhu
Assistant Professor of Finance
Department of Finance
Kansas State University
Manhattan, KS 66506
shuangzhu@ksu.edu
and
R. Kelley Pace
LREC Endowed Chair of Real Estate
Department of Finance
E.J. Ourso College of Business Administration
Louisiana State University
Baton Rouge, LA 70803-6308
kelley@spatial.us
and
Walter A. Morales III
Commonwealth Advisors LLC, Baton Rouge, LA 70801
Tel: +1-225-3439342
morales@lsu.edu
April 9, 2014
Abstract
Expectations of housing prices play an important role in real estate research.
Despite their importance, obtaining a reasonable proxy for such expectations
is a challenge. The existing literature on mortgage research either does not
include housing expectation proxies in empirical models, or uses “backward-
looking” proxies such as past housing appreciation or time series forecasts
based on past housing appreciation.
This paper proposes to use the transaction prices of Case-Shiller hous-
ing futures as an alternative “forward-looking” proxy. As an example, we
compare the performances of four different expectation proxies in explaining
mortgage default behavior. The loan level analysis shows that the futures
based expectation proxy outperforms other proxies by having the highest re-
gression model fit and being the only proxy that shows a significant negative
effect on mortgage default behavior, as theory suggests. Out of sample pre-
dictions also show that futures have better prediction accuracy than other
proxies. In addition, the paper shows that futures contain additional infor-
mation that is not present in the backward-looking proxies.
1 Introduction
Economic decisions often rely on expectations of variables in the future. This
presents a difficulty when working with empirical data since most variables
represent the outcomes of past decisions and therefore may imperfectly cap-
ture such expectations.
For example, the expected house price plays a role in individual default
decision since this affects both the benefit and the cost of making mortgage
payments through the perceived value of the property and the option to
default in the future (Kau and Kim, 1994; Ambrose et al., 1997; Foote et al.,
2008). While many researchers (e.g., Shiller, 2007) pay attention to the role
of housing expectations in the current mortgage crisis, obtaining a reasonable
proxy for expected housing appreciation is a challenge.1 The fundamental
difficulty is that market expectations are typically not directly observable.
Because of this difficulty, current empirical mortgage research either (1) does
not include housing expectation proxies in empirical models (e.g., Demyanyk
and Van Hemert, 2009), (2) uses past housing appreciation (e.g., Bajari et al.,
2008), or (3) uses a time series forecast (e.g., Goetzmann et al., 2009) as the
proxy.
This paper proposes a new proxy of housing expectations in mortgage
models by using the information from the transaction prices of Case-Shiller
housing futures. Since the contract prices of futures are based on market
participants’ beliefs concerning future housing prices, the transaction prices
incorporate the market expectation of housing prices.2
This paper compares the performances of four different housing expecta-
tion proxies in explaining default behavior. The four proxies are futures, past
year appreciation from the Case-Shiller house price index (CSI), past year
appreciation from the Federal Housing Finance Agency house price index
(FHFA), and time series forecasts. In addition, we investigate the additional
information content of futures that is not contained in the past price based
measures.
The results show that futures are a promising proxy for housing expec-
tations. First, futures have the highest regression model fit among all four
1For simplicity, we use the term appreciation for both price increases or declines.
2Financial futures are viewed as the market expectation of underlying product price
movements in the financial derivatives literature. For example, the Federal funds futures
are widely used as the market expectations of future monetary policies (e.g., Krueger and
Kuttner, 1996; Hanley and McNeil, 2007).
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measures. This indicates that futures might explain default behavior bet-
ter than other measures. Second, only futures consistently show that higher
housing expectations lower the default propensity, as theory suggests. Other
measures either exhibit mixed signs or are statistically insignificant. Third,
futures have better out of sample prediction accuracy than other proxies in
terms of the area under the receiver operating characteristic curve (AUC)
measure. Fourth, even after combining other proxies in the same regres-
sion, the coefficient estimates and standard errors of futures remain about
the same as with only futures in the regressions. This reveals that futures
contain information not captured by historical prices.
Finally, futures may play a more important role in upcoming real estate
research as the newly launched RPX housing futures trading on CBOE Fu-
tures Exchange covers more cities than the futures based on the Case-Shiller
index.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 introduces the data
and variables, Section 3 presents the empirical results, and Section 4 con-
cludes.
2 Data, Variables and Summary Statistics
This section first describes data sources and sample selection in Section 2.1,
then introduces variables and specifications in Section 2.2, and provides sum-
mary statistics in Section 2.3.
2.1 Data
The S&P/Case-Shiller home price indices (CSI) and the contract prices of
housing futures with CSI as the underlying asset are from Bloomberg at
the metropolitan (MSA) level. Housing futures are traded on the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange (CME). House price indices from the Federal Housing
Finance Agency (FHFA) are downloaded from their website at the MSA
level. The loan-level data comes from Blackbox Logic’s BBx.3 BBx covers
over 90 percent of US non-agency residential securitized deals.4 BBx has
3BBx data is similar to Loan Performance data. BBx data information is available at
www.bbxlogic.com/data.htm.
4Since our data is from privately securitized loans, the results may apply only to this
set of mortgages.
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detailed mortgage origination information and monthly updates of mortgage
payment information. Unemployment data is from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics at the MSAs level. National average 30 year fixed rate mortgage
(FRM) interest rates are from Freddie Mac’s national mortgage survey. The
zip code level household median incomes are from the 2000 Census.
Our sample includes single family, first lien loans with a 30 year contract
term in the ten MSAs with housing futures transactions. We include mort-
gages originated between May 2006, when housing futures started trading on
CME,5 to December 2007 and track the loan performances quarterly through
December 2009.6 Mortgages are limited to those entering the dataset within
three months of origination to control for survival bias. The number of loans
included in this study is 213, 693, with default rate equal to 33.3% and pre-
payment rate equal to 17.8%.
2.2 Variables
The event of interest is default, which is defined as the first 90 days delin-
quency. At each time period, the status of the loan could be in default,
prepaid in full, or censored.7 If the loan is either in default or prepaid,
all subsequent observations are dropped out of the sample. The number of
loan-quarter observations is about 1.7 million.
Explanatory variables include housing expectations, loan/borrower char-
acteristics, lagged unemployment rates, neighborhood median income and
controls for prepayment risk. Loan characteristics include HPI updated cur-
rent loan-to-value ratio (CLTV), a piggyback dummy for the contemporary
second lien status, initial contract rate, a full documentation status dummy,
various mortgage types dummies, an investor dummy, a purchase dummy,
the original loan amount, loan age, and a prepayment penalty dummy. We
also include the difference of national average rates for 30 year fixed rate
mortgages (FRM) between the current time and at loan origination to con-
trol for the prepayment risk. Borrower characteristic includes the credit score
(Fico). Lagged unemployment rate is intended to capture the local macroe-
5Although Case et al. (1993) have long been advocating a derivative market for housing
in US, it was not until May 2006 that such a market was established.
6After 2007, because of the mortgage crisis, very few newly originated loans were added
into the dataset.
7Loan status other than default or prepaid is considered censored which includes un-
informative censoring and current status.
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conomic condition. Neighborhood income is used to account for the wealth
effect. The variable definitions appear in Table 1.
This study examines four measures of housing expectations. The futures
proxies are inferred from the transaction prices of housing futures. The
CME issues futures contracts each quarter in February, May, August, and
November. Market participants include builders and developers, lenders,
mortgage portfolio managers, mutual funds, other financial institutions, and
individual investors. We first calculate the average transaction prices of
futures in the trading month one year before the maturity date, then divide
the number by lagged two months CSI, and minus one to get the quarterly
expectations.8 Next we linearly interpolate the quarterly data to obtain the
monthly expectations.
The previous year appreciation rates and the time series forecasts are
considered the competing measures. These historical price based measures
are often used as expectation proxies because various studies such as Case and
Shiller (1989) have established that housing appreciation exhibits positive
serial dependence.9 In another words, past price appreciation helps predict
future appreciation and individuals may form their expectations based on
recent past appreciation. Therefore, the second and third measures are the
previous one year appreciation rates from the CSI and FHFA indices. We
consider both CSI and FHFA indices since these have been widely used and
also are not perfectly correlated.
The fourth measure is the one year forecasts from time series model based
on CSI. We employed the autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA)
model since this is the most commonly used time series model. Factors are
included in the model to account for possible seasonal patterns in housing
prices. We first select the lags of the model, then use a 20 year rolling time
window to fit the data each month for each MSA area, then forecast. This
approach is dynamic and allows the model to incorporate the new information
for each time period. The selection criteria for the lags is to make all 44
(from May 2006 to December 2009) rolling window regressions converge for
each MSA. Due to the unusual housing price movements in our sample time
period, the time series regressions do not converge in many cases when using
longer lags. Therefore, we use relatively short time period lags in our model.
8Lagged two months HPI is used since the release of CSI is lagged by two months and
that represents the information available at the transaction time.
9However, the high transactions costs in real estate do not imply that the predictability
leads to arbitrage opportunities.
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Eight MSAs use ARIMA(12, 1, 0) and two MSAs use ARIMA(6, 1, 0). We
use a simple time series model since simple models often perform better in
forecasting competitions (Makridakis et al., 1983).
2.3 Summary Statistics
Table 2 reports the summary statistics of forecasting errors for different hous-
ing expectation measures for the ten MSA areas. Forecasting errors are cal-
culated as the difference of the ex ante expectation and the ex post realized
one-year housing appreciation. We report various summary statistics for pre-
diction accuracy: the mean absolute error (MAE), the root mean squared
error (RMSE), and the minimum and the maximum error. Several patterns
appear. First, the four different measures yield varying forecasting errors,
and futures overall outperform other proxies in forecasting housing appreci-
ation. In terms of both the MAE and the RMSE, futures yield the lowest
prediction errors in seven out of the ten MSAs. For example, in Miami, the
RMSE of futures forecasting error is 12.62%, while the RMSEs are 19.09%,
24.10% and 18.68% for the past CSI, the past FHFA, and the time series
forecasts respectively. For the remaining three MSAs, futures perform simi-
larly to the best measures in Boston and Las Vegas areas, and perform poorly
only in Denver. Futures also yield the narrowest range of prediction errors
in eight out of the ten MSAs. Second, forecasting errors of previous year ap-
preciations from CSI and FHFA also show differences. The past CSI seem to
point to more pessimistic expectations than the past FHFA indices in all ten
MSA areas since both the minimum and the maximum errors from past CSI
are lower than those from the past FHFA. The main reason for the difference
of the two indices lies in the different composition of the underlying assets.
FHFA includes only mortgages purchased by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac,
while CSI has a broader coverage of underlying properties. Other reasons
are that FHFA uses both transaction and appraisal values while CSI uses
only transaction prices, and the weight given to properties with longer in-
tervals between transactions are also different (Leventis, 2008). Third, time
series forecasts tend to under perform other measures in general. It shows
the largest dispersion in terms of the range of forecasting errors in all MSAs.
Time series forecast errors could be very large. For example, in San Francisco
area, the forecasting errors have a wide range from −62.23% to 36.40%.
Table 3 reports the Pearson correlation coefficients between futures and
other housing expectation proxies. The number in the parenthesis under the
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correlation coefficients is the p-value for the null hypothesis that the corre-
lation coefficient is not different from zero. First, note that the correlation
coefficients are relatively low with the highest number being slightly higher
than 0.7. Using a one percent significance level, past year appreciations from
CSI and FHFA each have three areas that are significantly positively cor-
related with housing futures expectations. Time series forecasts have five
MSAs that show significant correlations (although in the Boston area, the
correlation is negative). The results show that futures are not highly corre-
lated with other proxies. Both Table 2 and 3 indicate that futures seem to
be a quite different proxy from those measures that are extrapolated from
past housing prices.
3 Empirical Results
This section introduces the estimation model in Section 3.1, investigates the
performances of various proxies for housing expectations in explaining default
in Section 3.2, compares out of sample prediction accuracy in Section 3.3,
checks for robustness in Section 3.4, and studies the additional information
content of futures in Section 3.5.
3.1 Cox Proportional Hazard Model
The empirical analysis is conducted in the Cox proportional hazard model
setting (Cox, 1972) to investigate the factors that may affect the probability
of default. The advantages of the Cox model include that it can handle right
censoring and take time from origination to default into consideration. Also
the Cox model is a semi-parametric technique that does not require choosing
a specific probability distribution of the survival time, and is considered a
more robust approach.
The model specification is as in (1), where h(t) is the hazard function of
default and λ0(t) is called the baseline hazard function. The hazard function
represents the conditional probability that a borrower remains current on
mortgage payment at t+1 given that the borrower has current status at time
t. Estimation uses a partial likelihood method that allows estimation of only
the β coefficients without having to specify the baseline hazard function λ0(t).
The event of interest is default, with prepayment as the competing risk. The
explanatory variables in X include both static variables which are obtained
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at origination and time-varying variables which are updated quarterly. The
time-varying variables updated at each time t include expectations, CLTV,
loan age, interest rate difference, and lagged unemployment rate.
h(t,X) = λ0(t) exp(Xβ) (1)
3.2 Housing Expectations and Default
In making the decision to default, borrowers weigh the benefit of keeping the
house versus the cost of making the mortgage payments. Expected house
prices play a central role in the valuation process. On the one side, the value
of house to the borrower includes the expected future house price. On the
other side, as Kau and Kim (1994) and Kau et al. (1994) noted, the cost of
the mortgage payments to the borrower needs to take into consideration the
value of the future default option. This future default option value is affected
by the expected future house price. Foote et al. (2008) used a two time period
model to illustrate that higher expectations of future house prices reduce the
incentive to default even in face of current negative equity since borrowers are
in hope of market recovery in the future, which may bring them to positive
equity.
Despite of the importance of housing expectations, the existing proxies
are mainly model based and backward-looking in nature. In a normal hous-
ing market when housing prices are relatively predictable, these measures
might work well. However, in the recent housing market, those model based
measures performed poorly in forecasting housing price movements (Goetz-
mann et al., 2009). Also, since model based measures rely solely on past price
information, the same variable such as past year appreciation may represent
both the past market condition and expectation, which makes it difficult to
disentangle the two effects.
In addition, an identification issue can arise when using both the past
appreciation rate and the HPI updated current loan-to-value ratio in the
Cox proportional model since the past appreciation and the HPI updated
CLTV ratio could be highly correlated. However, the correlation between
these two variables is 0.0686 for this sample so that identification is not a
serious problem.
We first compare the regression results with different proxies of hous-
ing expectations. Table 4 reports the coefficient estimates, with the state
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clustered standard error in parenthesis. The first regression has expecta-
tions inferred from transaction prices of futures. The second uses the past
year appreciation of CSI. The third one uses the past year appreciation from
FHFA and the last one uses the one-year time series forecasts of housing
appreciation from the ARIMA models.
The results show that futures behave differently from other proxies. First,
from the model fit perspective, futures yield the highest model fit as mea-
sured by the minimum value of −2 lnL among four different proxies. This
indicates that futures might capture the true expectations better than other
proxies. Second, coefficients of futures and time series have negative signs
which suggest that higher housing expectations lower the probability of de-
fault, while both measures of past appreciation have positive signs. Futures
also have the largest magnitude estimates. Third, as for statistical signifi-
cance, only futures are significant at the one percent significance level. In
sum, futures are the only measure that shows that higher housing expecta-
tions significantly reduce the default propensity as predicted by theory. The
overall results suggest that different proxies could lead to quite different in-
ferences concerning the role of housing expectations. Although inaccurate
proxies may indicate that housing expectations do not play an important
role in default decisions, futures seem to conform more closely to our prior
beliefs.
From the futures estimates in Table 4, a one percent increase in housing
expectation decreases the hazard of default by 1.32 percent (exp (−0.0133 · 1)−
1 = −1.32%). An expected one percent decrease in housing expectation
increases the hazard of default by 1.34 percent (exp (−0.0133 · −1) − 1 =
1.34%). Although negative equity is a necessary condition for strategic de-
fault, expectations of house price declines may lead homeowners at the mar-
gin to make a decision to default.
Other variables have the expected signs. A larger current loan-to-value
ratio, having a second lien, and a higher contract rate lead to a higher
propensity to default. Higher Fico scores and full documentation decrease the
propensity to default. Various exotic loans increase the propensity to default
relative to the fully amortized fixed rate mortgages. Seasoned loans have a
lower probability of default. Macroeconomic conditions such as the lagged
unemployment also affect loan performance. Neighborhoods with higher in-
comes have lower default rates.
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3.3 Out of Sample Prediction Accuracy
To further investigate the out of sample model prediction accuracy for differ-
ent expectation measures, we perform two experiments in this section. The
first out of sample experiment is using the origination year 2006 cohort for
estimation and using the origination year 2007 cohort for prediction analysis.
The second experiment is using the pre-2009 data for estimation and using
the 2009 data for prediction analysis.
After fitting the estimation sample, we calculate the survival probabilities
for each observation in the prediction sample based on estimates from the
fitted model.10 The survival probability is the predicted probability of sur-
viving to time t+ 1 given survival to time t. One subtracted by the survival
probability gives the predicted default probability, that is the probability of
defaulting at time t+ 1 given current status at time t.
The predicted default probability is a continuous variable, while the ob-
served mortgage status is a discrete variable. Prediction errors for a binary
variable fall into two categories. First, one could predict current status when
the true status is default. This could lead to rejecting a “valid” loan modi-
fication which could have changed the status to current (with modification)
from default (without modification). This is analogous to a type I error in
statistics where one rejects a true null hypothesis. Second, one could pre-
dict default when the true status is current which may lead to granting a
loan modification to a borrower who would have continued to stay current.
This is analogous to a type II error in statistics where one accepts a false
null hypothesis of default. Prediction errors also affect valuation of mort-
gage backed securities and the risk management of portfolios with mortgage
related assets.
By adopting a decision rule of Pr(default) ≥ c → decision, where c is a
cutpoint value between 0 and 1, there is a tradeoff between type I and type
II errors. A low value of c would result in low levels of type I errors but
would lead to high levels of type II errors, and vice versa.
Since setting c leads to varying rates of type I and type II errors, this
makes it hard to compare model performances. A common approach to
evaluate binary dependent variable model predictive accuracy when the cut-
point c varies is to compare the area under the receiver operating (ROC)
curve (Zhou et al., 2002). The area under the ROC curve is termed the AUC
10In order to calculate the survival probability, we also estimate the baseline hazard
function after estimating the coefficient β.
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statistic. The ROC is a plot of false positive rate (x-axis) versus true positive
rate (y-axis) for the full spectrum of possible cutpoints c ranging from 0 to
1. The AUC represents the probability that a randomly chosen default loan
is correctly ranked higher than a randomly chosen non-default loan (Hanley
and McNeil, 1982). Higher AUC values indicate better model classification
ability and better prediction accuracy.
Table 5 reports the AUC for the out of sample predictions for the four
measures. Futures slightly outperform the other proxies for both experi-
ments. For example, the forward prediction experiment yields the AUC of
0.7231 for futures, which is higher than that of past CSI (0.7101), past FHFA
(0.7081), and time series forecasts (0.7207). These results indicate that us-
ing futures in the mortgage default model could improve the out of sample
predictive power of the model.
3.4 Robustness Checks
Next we conduct various robustness checks by including year and/or state
dummies to capture temporal and/or state fixed effects. Other variables
and model specifications are the same as in Table 4. Table 6 reports the
regression results. For simplicity, we only report the estimates of housing ex-
pectations. Panel A regressions include only annual dichotomous variables.
Panel B regressions include only the state dichotomous variables and Panel
C regressions include both state and year dichotomous variables. Across
different specifications, futures consistently have a better model fit and the
coefficients are significant and negative. Past CSI and past FHFA have mixed
signs and remain insignificant. When year dummies are included, time se-
ries forecasts become significantly negative, but turn insignificant as state
dummies are added in the regression.
3.5 Information Content in Futures
In this section, we investigate the information content of futures. In Table 7,
except for expectations variables, we use the same model specifications as
the regressions in Table 4. For the expectations variables, each regression
includes futures and some other proxies to study whether futures contain
information beyond past housing appreciation data. The results show that
both coefficients and standard error estimates of futures are stable across
various specifications. The coefficients are negative and significant even after
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controlling for various combinations of past price information. This indicates
that futures contain information that are not reflected in the past housing
prices, which is not surprising since individuals use all the available informa-
tion to form their expectations, not just past prices.
4 Conclusion
Housing price expectations play a role in borrower mortgage default decisions.
However, because of the difficulty of obtaining a good proxy, prior mortgage
research either does not include housing expectation proxies in empirical
work or uses a past price based approach.
This paper proposes to use information from housing futures contracts
as an alternative proxy since the transaction prices incorporate expectations
for future house prices. As an example, we compare the performances of
four different proxies for expectations in explaining borrower mortgage de-
fault behavior. The results show that the futures based proxy outperforms
other proxies by having the highest regression model fit as well as being the
only proxy that shows a significant effect in the correct direction on mort-
gage default behavior. Futures also outperform other proxies in term of out
of sample prediction accuracy. The results also show that futures contain
additional information that is not contained in the past housing prices.
Since housing expectations may affect various real estate issues such as
mortgage credit supply, housing demand and housing supply, the use of fu-
tures may help these other research areas. Finally, the newly launched RPX
housing futures trading on CBOE Futures Exchange, which covers more
cities, may increase the potential for using futures in real estate research.
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Table 1: Variable Definitions
Variable Definition
Default First 90 days delinquency.
Expectation Proxies for housing appreciation expectation.
Futures Housing expectation derived from housing
futures.
Past CSI Past year appreciation from CSI.
Past FHFA Past year appreciation from FHFA housing
index.
Time Series Time series forecast of next year housing ap-
preciation.
CLTV HPI updated current loan-to-value ratio.
Piggyback Dummy variable, =1 if the property has ju-
nior liens at origination, =0 otherwise.
Interest Initial contract rate of the mortgage.
Fico Fair, Isaac and Company credit score of the
borrower at origination, scaled by 100.
Full Doc Dummy variable, =1 if borrower offers full
documentation for loan application, =0 oth-
erwise.
Exotic ARM Dummy variable, =1 if adjustable rate mort-
gage with deferred amortization provisions
including interest only, negative amortiza-
tion and/or balloon payment, =0 otherwise.
Hybrid ARM Dummy variable, =1 if adjustable rate mort-
gage with fixed initial interest rate, no de-
ferred amortization provisions, =0 otherwise.
Reg ARM Dummy variable, =1 if adjustable rate mort-
gage with no fixed initial interest rate, no
deferred amortization provisions, =0 other-
wise.
Exotic FRM Dummy variable, =1 if fixed rate mortgage
with deferred amortization provisions includ-
ing interest only and/or balloon payment, =0
otherwise.
FRM Dummy variable, =1 if fully amortized fixed
rate mortgage, =0 otherwise.
Investor Dummy variable, =1 if the purpose of the use
of the house as an investment, =0 otherwise.
Purchase Dummy variable, =1 if new purchase, =0
otherwise.
Loan Amount The original loan amount, scaled by 10000.
Loan Age Loan age in year.
Prepay Penalty Dummy variable, =1 if the loan has prepay-
ment penalty, =0 otherwise.
Rate Diff Difference of 30 year national average FRM
rate between current period and at loan orig-
ination.
Lag Unemployment Lagged unemployment rate at MSA level.
Income Log median household income at zip code
level.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics for Housing Expectation Prediction Error (in
%)
MAE RMSE Min Max
CBSA=14460 Boston
Futures 3.5096 4.0021 -6.8031 5.1187
Past CSI 3.4694 4.8480 -12.5622 4.3710
Past FHFA 3.3441 3.9590 -8.7382 4.7331
Time Series 4.4839 6.0839 -18.3994 6.6072
CBSA=16980 Chicago
Futures 6.2781 7.6536 -6.4341 16.1615
Past CSI 8.3354 9.2480 -17.0678 11.3075
Past FHFA 8.4901 9.5593 -7.9613 16.5559
Time Series 10.1504 13.1547 -41.4136 14.0367
CBSA=19740 Denver
Futures 4.0041 5.0985 -9.8921 4.6256
Past CSI 3.4941 4.2602 -9.6221 4.6752
Past FHFA 3.0362 3.4425 -4.5165 5.8672
Time Series 4.0887 5.0773 -13.7557 10.0432
CBSA=29820 Las Vegas
Futures 16.1533 17.7078 -0.8037 28.8965
Past CSI 15.9296 17.7061 -27.2618 24.2718
Past FHFA 17.3333 18.4959 -20.1603 27.0031
Time Series 18.1639 20.2435 -38.0747 28.9701
CBSA=31100 Los Angeles
Futures 11.4815 13.2243 -17.1213 20.9443
Past CSI 16.8538 18.5602 -29.6379 21.4300
Past FHFA 17.3861 18.6574 -23.5411 24.9940
Time Series 17.9991 19.6259 -39.9177 23.0501
CBSA=33100 Miami
Futures 10.5809 12.6196 0.2158 23.2321
Past CSI 17.5363 19.0863 -27.0390 25.9994
Past FHFA 22.3482 24.0952 -25.3734 35.1607
Time Series 14.5974 18.6807 -39.3754 33.6565
CBSA=35620 New York
Futures 3.7003 4.8899 -13.1914 8.1654
Past CSI 6.0124 6.7742 -11.7984 12.3544
Past FHFA 6.9793 7.6926 -6.1583 12.8273
Time Series 5.9520 7.5304 -21.7005 10.4550
CBSA=41740 San Diego
Futures 10.7188 12.3521 -16.9942 19.9770
Past CSI 14.7859 17.2142 -32.8432 17.4838
Past FHFA 13.9238 15.0436 -23.9575 18.3137
Time Series 17.2327 19.4695 -40.1732 21.0785
CBSA=41860 San Francisco
Futures 14.9090 16.9468 -26.5580 29.0233
Past CSI 18.7101 22.6373 -46.2595 24.9317
Past FHFA 17.1143 18.8624 -27.3689 28.9272
Time Series 23.5628 27.5822 -62.2342 36.3986
CBSA=47900 Washington
Futures 8.9663 9.9171 -10.0325 16.7302
Past CSI 10.9640 12.6698 -24.2632 15.4599
Past FHFA 12.4408 13.1086 -16.1769 20.2073
Time Series 12.8718 14.7285 -28.2962 26.7652
Notes: This table reports the summary statistics for prediction error (e = ex ante
expectation - ex post realized appreciation). MAE is the mean absolute prediction
error. RMSE is the root mean squared prediction error.
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Table 3: Pearson Correlation Coefficients between Housing Expectations
from Futures and other Proxies
CBSA Past CSI Past FHFA Time Series
14460 −0.2946 0.0568 −0.3945
(0.0522) (0.7144) (0.0081)
16980 0.3189 0.2267 0.3061
(0.0348) (0.1389) (0.0433)
19740 0.2142 0.2909 −0.0256
(0.1626) (0.0554) (0.8692)
29820 −0.2170 −0.1431 −0.1058
(0.1571) (0.3541) (0.4942)
31100 0.6279 0.5664 0.6907
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000)
33100 0.1331 −0.1433 0.5612
(0.3892) (0.3535) (0.0001)
35620 0.7036 0.6560 0.7080
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
41740 0.5169 0.4820 0.7094
(0.0003) (0.0009) (0.0000)
41860 −0.0323 0.0935 0.0203
(0.8352) (0.5459) (0.8958)
47900 0.0599 −0.0459 −0.0234
(0.6994) (0.7673) (0.8800)
Notes: This table reports the Pearson correlation coefficients be-
tween futures and other housing expectation proxies. The number
in the parenthesis under the correlation coefficients is the p-value
for the null hypothesis that the correlation coefficient is not different
from zero.
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Table 4: Different Proxies for Housing Expectations
Futures Past CSI Past FHFA Time Series
Expectation −0.0133∗∗ 0.0020 0.0076 −0.0018
(0.0040) (0.0037) (0.0036) (0.0012)
CLTV 0.0229∗∗ 0.0228∗∗ 0.0238∗∗ 0.0218∗∗
(0.0018) (0.0020) (0.0015) (0.0022)
Piggyback 0.5780∗∗ 0.5771∗∗ 0.5759∗∗ 0.5778∗∗
(0.0380) (0.0393) (0.0387) (0.0398)
Interest 0.0749∗∗ 0.0744∗∗ 0.0737∗∗ 0.0753∗∗
(0.0079) (0.0075) (0.0073) (0.0080)
FICO −0.7787∗∗ −0.7741∗∗ −0.7742∗∗ −0.7765∗∗
(0.0406) (0.0421) (0.0426) (0.0428)
Full Doc −0.3856∗∗ −0.3926∗∗ −0.3976∗∗ −0.3865∗∗
(0.0466) (0.0505) (0.0481) (0.0475)
Exotic ARM 0.5439∗∗ 0.5464∗∗ 0.5372∗∗ 0.5499∗∗
(0.0418) (0.0453) (0.0462) (0.0432)
Hybrid ARM 0.5855∗∗ 0.5803∗∗ 0.5680∗∗ 0.5876∗∗
(0.0238) (0.0265) (0.0263) (0.0237)
Exotic FRM 0.2199∗∗ 0.2231∗∗ 0.2200∗∗ 0.2248∗∗
(0.0490) (0.0495) (0.0500) (0.0486)
Reg ARM 0.3725∗∗ 0.3635∗∗ 0.3563∗∗ 0.3717∗∗
(0.0652) (0.0627) (0.0668) (0.0643)
Investor 0.0851 0.0778 0.0818 0.0741
(0.0470) (0.0495) (0.0492) (0.0480)
Purchase −0.0066 −0.0054 −0.0114 0.0009
(0.0189) (0.0184) (0.0151) (0.0204)
Loan Amount 0.0004 0.0024 0.0023 0.0020
(0.0056) (0.0030) (0.0031) (0.0038)
Loan Age −0.4098∗∗ −0.4272∗∗ −0.4354∗∗ −0.4339∗∗
(0.0246) (0.0208) (0.0202) (0.0190)
Prepay Penalty 0.0215 0.0370 0.0454 0.0270
(0.0491) (0.0455) (0.0434) (0.0500)
Rate Diff −0.1784∗∗ −0.1799∗∗ −0.1594∗∗ −0.1891∗∗
(0.0589) (0.0552) (0.0588) (0.0544)
Lag Unemployment −0.1809∗∗ −0.1817∗∗ −0.1777∗∗ −0.1803∗∗
(0.0349) (0.0385) (0.0381) (0.0392)
Income −0.3858∗∗ −0.4094∗∗ −0.4186∗∗ −0.4032∗∗
(0.0651) (0.0676) (0.0689) (0.0664)
-2lnL 1623539 1623892 1623747 1623826
Notes: This table reports the coefficient estimates of the Cox proportional hazard model, with the state
clustered standard error in the parenthesis. The dependent variable is mortgage payment status. ∗∗
p < 0.01
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Table 5: Out of Sample Prediction Accuracy: Area under ROC Curve
(1) (2)
Origination Cohort Prediction Forward Prediction
Futures 0.8030 0.7231
Past CSI 0.8014 0.7101
Past FHFA 0.8013 0.7081
Time Series 0.8022 0.7207
Notes: This table reports the area under the ROC curve (AUC) for com-
parison of the out of sample predictions. The first experiment is using the
origination 2006 cohort for estimation and using origination 2007 cohort for
out of sample prediction. The second experiment is using pre-2009 data for
estimation and year 2009 data for out of sample prediction. The AUC is
calculated for the out of sample predictions.
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Table 6: Robustness Checks
Futures Past CSI Past FHFA Time Series
Panel A Year Dummies Included
Expectation −0.0195∗∗ −0.0013 0.0049 −0.0039∗∗
(0.0050) (0.0051) (0.0052) (0.0014)
-2lnL 1622616 1623286 1623216 1623076
Panel B State Dummies Included
Expectation −0.0072∗∗ −0.0058 −0.0035 −0.0020
(0.0028) (0.0036) (0.0057) (0.0015)
-2lnL 1621696 1621756 1621759 1621731
Panel C Year and State Dummies Included
Expectation −0.0121∗∗ −0.0095 −0.0129 −0.0030
(0.0045) (0.0067) (0.0111) (0.0014)
-2lnL 1619962 1620111 1619982 1620095
Notes: This table reports the Cox proportional regression results of various robustness checks
by including year and/or state dummies to capture temporal and/or state fixed effects. Other
variables and model specifications are the same as in Table 4. For simplicity, we only report
the estimates of housing expectations. Panel A regressions include only annual dichotomous
variables. Panel B regressions include only the state dichotomous variables and Panel C regres-
sions include both state and year dichotomous variables. The state clustered standard error is
in the parenthesis. ∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 7: Combination of Forecasts in Regression
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Futures −0.0148∗∗ −0.0145∗∗ −0.0132∗∗ −0.0141∗∗ −0.0130∗∗ −0.0130∗∗ −0.0130∗∗
(0.0041) (0.0038) (0.0045) (0.0034) (0.0046) (0.0040) (0.0041)
Past CSI 0.0049 −0.0025 0.0099 0.0018
(0.0029) (0.0063) (0.0077) (0.0116)
Past FHFA 0.0092∗∗ 0.0111 0.0106 0.0096
(0.0036) (0.0066) (0.0049) (0.0070)
Time Series −0.0001 −0.0032 −0.0017 −0.0021
(0.0015) (0.0034) (0.0017) (0.0036)
-2lnL 1623479 1623360 1623539 1623352 1623415 1623330 1623328
Notes: This table reports the Cox proportional regression results by including various com-
binations of expectation proxies. Other than the expectations, other variables and model
specifications are the same as in Table 4. For simplicity, we only report the estimates of
housing expectations. The state clustered standard error is in the parenthesis. ∗∗ p < 0.01
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